

ment of political questions, too, he differs from both Major and Knox. Reason and history, rather than the lore of the schools or the teaching of Scripture, are his guides.

The "De Jure" was written, as Buchanan himself tells us in the dedicatory epistle to his pupil James VI., in the midst of the struggle of 1567-68, though it was not published till 1579. His aim was to instruct his royal pupil in the duties of a king and the rights of the people. It professes to be a dialogue between the author and Thomas Maitland, brother of the secretary, who has just returned from France. Buchanan inquires what the French think of the action of the revolutionary Scots towards their queen. In his reply Maitland appears as the indignant opponent of the revolutionists, and the disputants plunge at once into the discussion of the burning question of the right of a people to vindicate justice against a ruler who acts unjustly. The question of the origin of the kingship raises the question of the origin of society. Society, he holds, as Grotius held after him, is the result, not of utility but of the social instinct which is innate in man, and indeed common to the more domptable of animals (*Ea est qucedam naturce visy non hominibus modo, sed mansuetoribus etiam alwrum animantium indita*). Nature being the unwritten law of God, God is the ultimate author of human society. As the human body is subject to disease, and requires the care of a physician for its restoration and preservation, so the body politic needs a king to preserve it from the action of disintegrating forces and maintain its strength. That kings are not created for themselves, but for the people (*reges non sibi, sed populo creatos esse*) may be inferred from the names given them, apart altogether from their function. Is not the king spoken of as father, shepherd, leader, prince, governor? As the physician preserves health by keeping the body in a certain temperament, the king performs the same function towards the body politic by maintaining justice. Maitland prefers the word temperance to justice, and Buchanan is not disposed to quarrel about the name as long as the health of the body politic is assured, though he thinks that the equability or moderation, indispensable to this end, may most aptly be designated by the term justice. As the body politic cannot subsist without the maintenance